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EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
Earl M. Jones, 11I*
Eduardo F. Cuaderes Jr.**
Jennifer A. Youpa***
I. INTRODUCTION
N this Survey period, employers are fretting over the possible social
and political repercussions of the Enron and Worldcom collapses and
the consequent enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley. Much has been writ-
ten to educate employers of the broad prohibitions against firing or retali-
ating against employees who blow the whistle on corporations, their
officers or directors, or employees who otherwise participate in any fed-
eral investigation.1 For practitioners who represent plaintiffs, there will
be challenges to convince judges that the cries of defense counsel is evi-
dence that Congress intended to open several new theories of recovery.
As a precursor to how these new theories may be used, the El Paso
Court of Appeals in Garcia v. Levis Strauss & Co.2 recognized that an
employee may have a cause of action under Section 451.001 of the Texas
Labor Code for a hostile environment based upon an employee's filing of
a workers' compensation claim. The logic followed by the court is not
startling. Because the Texas Labor Code prohibits "discrimination"
against employees in connection with certain protected activity, and be-
cause state and federal courts have consistently held-first with sex and
then with other protected traits such as age, race, and disability-that
"harassment" is a form of discrimination, the Texas Labor Code must
* Earl M. Jones, III. is Vice President, Legal, Dean Foods Company, specializing in
labor and employment law matters. Mr. Jones received his J.D. with honors from Southern
Methodist University School of Law in 1994. While at SMU, Mr. Jones served as a leading
articles editor for the SMU Law Review Association.
** Eduardo F. Cuaderes, Jr., is a shareholder in the Dallas office of Littler Mendel-
son, P.C. Prior to joining Littler Mendelson in 1995, Mr. Cuaderes served as a senior trial
attorney in the Dallas District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
*** Jennifer A. Youpa, Senior Counsel at the Dallas office of Littler Mendelson, P.C.,
earned her J.D. from the University of Texas Law School in 1985, where she served on the
Texas Law Review.
1. See Jackson Walker, LLP, http://www.jw.com/articles/articles.cfm; Thompson &
Knight, LLP http://www.tklaw.com/website.nsf/WEBnewx/16EFBBA455D4EA4D86256C
3200621327; Gardere Wynne Sewell, LLP, http://www.gardere.com/NewsEventsPubs/
speeches.asp; Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, http://wwwl.jonesday.com/pubs/pubs.asp; Vin-
son & Elkins, http://www.vinson-elkins.com/publications/labor-employment/laboralert
0103.htm; Littler Mendelson, P.C., http://www.littler.com/nwsltr/asap-corp-responsibility.
html.
2. Garcia v. Levi Strauss & Co., 85 S.W.3d 362 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.).
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also prohibit "worker's compensation" harassment. 3 After holding that
such a theory of recovery exists, the court then held that the following
facts were not "severe and pervasive:" a supervisor saying that all injured
workers were stupid and illiterate, statements/threats that the plaintiff
would not remain employed, a comment that the plaintiff looked like an
animal, and a comment that employees with work-related injuries tried to
take advantage of the company. 4 To the court, these were just "un-
friendly incidents related to her status as a workers' compensation claim-
ant," not a hostile environment, and the court granted summary
judgment for the employer.5 The court's decision will raise several ques-
tions for practioners. For example, should employers adopt a policy
prohibiting workers' compensation harassment? If so, should employers
adopt policies prohibiting harassment against any employees who com-
plain or who make complaints protected by any statute or common law?
Section 451.001, while using the term "discrimination," is more akin to a
statute prohibiting retaliation.6 Therefore, according to the court's ratio-
nale, an employer may be liable for a Sarbanes-Oxley hostile environ-
ment. For employers, the equal opportunity harassment defense (i.e., he




In Salinas v. O'Neill,7 the Fifth Circuit continued its skeptical view of
unsupported claims of emotional distress damages. Salinas worked for
the United States Custom Services. After failing to receive a promotion,
he sued contending that he was the victim of age and race discrimination
and retaliation.8 The evidence presented at trial convinced a jury that the
government retaliated against Salina and awarded him one million dollars
in compensatory damages, which the trial court reduced the award to
$300,000, the maximum recovery by law. 9 On appeal, the court reviewed
Salina's testimony as to his loss of self-esteem, loss of sleep, stress, para-
noia, fear of future retaliation, high blood pressure, and deteriorating re-
lationship with his wife and son. On these facts, the court applied the
"maximum recovery rule," which requires the remittitur of a damage
award that is excessive. Comparing the jury's award with other similar
cases, the court determined that the evidence supported an award of only
3. Id. at 370.
4. Garcia, 85 S.W.3d at 370.
5. Id. at 371.
6. Hence, most practitioners refer to the claim as a workers' compensation retaliation
claim.
7. Salinas v. O'Neill, 286 F.3d 827 (5th Cir. 2002), rehg denied, No. 01-40495, 2002
WL 1222751 (5th Cir. May 20, 2002).
8. Id. at 829.
9. Id.
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$100,000, which it increased by a multiplier of 150%.l °
2. Procedural Cases/Filing Of Charges Of Discrimination
In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,1 the United States
Supreme Court clarified the time frames for filing charges of discrimina-
tion with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
While noting that district courts and courts of appeal have fashioned vari-
ous tests to determine whether someone filed a charge of discrimination
in a timely manner, the Court went directly to the statute to create its
own test.12 The statute provides that a charge "shall be filed within one
hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred.' 3 The Court interpreted that "discrete" acts of discrimination,
such as "termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to
hire" must be filed within the 180 or 300 day limitation period, subject to
equitable doctrines such as tolling or estoppel. 14
On the other hand, "[h]ostile environment claims are different in kind
from discrete acts."'15 The Court found statutory support for distinguish-
ing between discrete acts and acts of hostile environment from the word
"occurred." A hostile environment is a series of separate acts and if one
of those acts occurs within the limitation period, "the entire time period
of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for the purposes
of determining liability."'1 6 The Court also suggests that practitioners
raise a laches defense if a plaintiff "unreasonably delays in filing a suit
and as a result harms the defendant.' 7
Deciding whether a plaintiff timely filed a lawsuit has never been a
precise science. The law requires that a plaintiff file a lawsuit within
ninety days of "receipt" of a right to sue letter from the EEOC. The task
for the parties is proving the date of receipt because the EEOC does not
typically send such letters via certified mail. In Taylor v. Books a Million,
Inc.,18 the plaintiff filed his suit ninety-eight days after the issuance of the
right to sue letter. Because there was no evidence of actual receipt, the
court analyzed presumptions used by other circuits to determine whether
a suit was filed timely. Because no court, according to the Fifth Circuit,
has presumed that a plaintiff received a right-to-sue letter more than
seven days after the date of issuance, the court upheld dismissal of the
lawsuit.' 9
10. Id. at 831-33.
11. Nat'l Ry. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
12. Id. at 108.
13. Id. at 109.
14. Id. at 113.
15. Id. at 115.
16. Id. at 116.
17. Id. at 121.
18. Taylor v. Books a Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2002).
19. Id. at 380.
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In EEOC v. Houston Sheet Metal Apprenticeship Committee,20 the
plaintiff, who was deaf and could not speak, sued a Taft-Hartley appren-
ticeship committee because he was denied access to an apprenticeship
program. The plaintiff applied to the program twice, once in 1990 and
again in 1996. In 1999, he was told that the committee denied his applica-
tion because he could not hear or speak. He filed his charge just a few
days later. The committee asked the court to dismiss the lawsuit because
the charge was untimely. The plaintiff contended that he was not told the
reason for his denial despite several follow up requests between 1996 and
1999. The committee, on the other hand, argued that it had no duty to
explain its rationale, and that the plaintiff never inquired as to the reason
his application was denied. The plaintiff asked the court to apply the
continuing violation doctrine because the plaintiff established that: (1)
the acts of discrimination consisted of the same type of discrimination; (2)
the alleged acts were recurring and not isolated; and (3) the plaintiff was
unaware of any facts to indicate that he had a duty to assert his rights.21
Judge Hitner found that fact issues existed to preclude him from grant-
ing the committee's motion for summary judgment.22 First, he could not
establish as a matter of law whether the acts were recurring or isolated.
According to the plaintiff, he made several additional inquiries between
1996 and 1999, which the committee denied, thus creating a contested fact
issue. Second, Judge Hitner held a "fact issue exists concerning whether
a reasonably prudent person in Lee's shoes would have known in 1996,
when he completed his application and was rejected by the Committee,
that his inability to hear and speak was the reason for his rejection. ' 23
With these fact issues present, the court allowed the disability discrimina-
tion claim to proceed. For practitioners, this case is noteworthy because a
previous "discrete" act, outside the statute of limitations, might serve as
the basis of a discrimination charge merely because an employee is una-
ware that an employer's decision was motivated by discriminatory
animus.24
The complexity of analyzing the jurisdiction of a trial court to resolve
claims of discrimination under the Texas Commission on Human Rights
Act was made evident in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola.25 The plain-
tiff contended at trial, and the jury agreed, that Wal-Mart terminated him
because of his disability. In his petition, Canchola plead that he had ex-
hausted his administrative remedies by filing a charge with the TCHR;
20. EEOC v. Houston Sheet Metal Apprenticeship Comm., No. Civ. A.H.-00-3390,
2002 WL 1263893 (S.D. Tex. May 31, 2002, no pet.).
21. Id. at *4.
22. Id. at *5.
23. Id.
24. In contrast, the court dismissed a race discrimination complaint because the charge
of discrimination was filed 315 days after the termination decision in Ward v. TXU Gas &
Elec. Co., No. 3:01-CV-0079-M5, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8248 (N.D. Tex. May 8, 2002),
affd, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 26858 (Dec. 3, 2002).
25. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola, 64 S.W.3d 524 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2001, pet. filed).
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Wal-Mart plead an affirmative defense to the contrary. However, Wal-
Mart never filed a special exception, motion for summary judgment, plea
in abatement, or requested a jury question on this issue. The first time
Wal-Mart contended that the court did not have jurisdiction, apart from
its affirmative defense, was after the close of the evidence in its motion
for directed verdict, and then again in its motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict.26
Wal-Mart provided evidence that Canchola did not file a charge of dis-
crimination with the EEOC and that the only document filed with the
TCHR was an intake questionnaire. The court of appeals noted that the
current policy "is to reduce vulnerability of final judgments to attack on
the ground that the tribunal lacked subject matter jurisdiction. ''27 Based
on this policy, the court distinguished the holding in Wilmer-Hutchins In-
dependent School District v. Sullivan28 that a party cannot confer jurisdic-
tion on a court if there is no jurisdiction otherwise. The court then
looked to Canchola's pleadings, accepted them as true, and rejected Wal-
Mart's contention that an unverified intake questionnaire is not a formal
charge, as required by Texas law. Wal-Mart also contended that because
Canchola did not check "disability" but only indicated "race" and "age"
on the intake questionnaire, the court did not have jurisdiction to enter
judgment based on the jury's finding of disability discrimination.2 9 In re-
jecting this argument, the court found that "Wal-Mart has not shown that
disability due to a heart condition is not factually and reasonably related
to age."'30 The court then affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
The United States Supreme Court, in Edelman v. Lynchburg College,31
held that an individual who files an unverified charge of discrimination
with the EEOC may subsequently file an amended charge under oath,
and that such an oath may relate back to the original complaint. The
Court reviewed a number of situations in other settings in which a rela-
tion-back cure has been used and approved by the Court. Because Title
VII's remedial scheme is designed to be initiated by laypersons, the Court
would not adopt a rule that would risk forfeiting an individual's rights
based on an inadvertent decision or act.32
3. Leaves Of Absence
For employers, creating an attendance policy that is easy to administer
and disciplines employees for poor attendance is a challenge. For proba-
tionary employees, the Fifth Circuit may have made it easier to establish
26. Id. at 532.
27. Id. at 533 (citing Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. 2000)).
28. Id. at 534 (citing Wilmer-Hutchins Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Sullivan, 51 S.W.3d 293,
294-95 (Tex. 2001)).
29. Id. at 536.
30. Id.




bright line rules. In Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,33 the employer
adopted an attendance policy of terminating any employee who missed
more than three days during a ninety-day probationary period. Stout
missed three days because of her pregnancy and was terminated. Without
facts that the employer applied the policy inconsistently, the court held
there was no evidence that Stout's pregnancy motivated the decision to
terminate. 34 The court also refused to allow Stout's disparate impact
claim to go forward. Such a theory would require employers to provide
pregnancy leave, something that is not required by the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act. 35
4. Evidence Of Pretext
For attorneys who advise employers in connection with a termination,
the Fifth Circuit's decision in Wallace v. Methodist Hospital Systems is
instructive because it suggests that an employer should list each and every
truthful reason for terminating an employee. 36 The hospital terminated
Wallace, who was pregnant at the time, for two independent reasons.
Wallace introduced evidence that another employee, who was not preg-
nant, engaged in nearly identical activity without being terminated. How-
ever, Wallace introduced no evidence that the second reason for
termination was pretextual. The Fifth Circuit, therefore, upheld summary
judgment because Wallace could not offer pretext evidence of the hospi-
tal's nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination. 37
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Ramirez v. Landry's Seafood Inn & Oys-
ter Bar38 highlights the type of evidence a plaintiff must establish to sur-
vive summary judgment. Landry's created a document at the time it
decided to terminate Ramirez indicating that she was fired because: (1)
"[sihe has been working behind the scenes attempting to lure fellow em-
ployees to leave Landry's;" and (2) "she is spreading rumors about a
manager being fired for calling in sick."' 39 To defeat summary judgment,
Ramirez introduced evidence that the employer knew that a white co-
worker engaged in similar conduct, but was not disciplined. Such evi-
dence is not only pretext, it also is a "presumption of discriminatory in-
tent."' 40 In addition, the court ignored an additional rationale for
Ramirez's termination-that she had prior disciplinary problems-be-
cause no mention was made of this reason in the initial termination
memo. The court also found that Ramirez introduced evidence that the
employer was using the spreading-rumors-reason as pretext for discrimi-
33. Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856 (5th Cir. 2002).
34. Id. at 860-61.
35. Id. at 861.
36. Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S.
1078 (2002).
37. Id. at 225-26.
38. Ramirez v. Landry's Seafood Inn & Oyster Bar, 280 F.3d 576 (5th Cir. 2002), reh'g
denied, No. 01-50015, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 5921 (5th Cir. Mar. 7, 2002).
39. Id. at 577.
40. Id. at 578.
1552 [Vol. 56
EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW
nation because of the complete lack of evidence to support that she had
engaged in such conduct.41 In sum, the Ramirez decision provides a
roadmap for defeating a motion for summary judgment.
In Price v. Federal Express Corp.,42 the Fifth Circuit reiterated its pre-
text analysis: "the plaintiff must substantiate his claim of pretext through
evidence demonstrating that discrimination lay at the heart of the em-
ployer's decision. ' 43 Price applied for a security position, but was not
chosen because Federal Express chose a white male, who it considered to
have better qualifications. The applicant chosen did not have a college
degree, a certain professional certification, or five years of law enforce-
ment experience-all identified as requirements for the position. Price
argued that because the applicant chosen did not even meet the minimum
qualifications for the position, he introduced sufficient evidence of pre-
text to survive summary judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that a reasona-
ble jury could not have concluded that Price's race played any role in the
adverse decision because the white applicant's "skill set, including his sig-
nificant military, security, and leadership experience, could have reasona-
bly outweighed Price's better education and longer tenure with the
company. '44
In Germany v. Austin Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,45 the employer adopted
a policy prohibiting firearms in the workplace. In a case of extremely bad
luck, the plaintiff's car was stolen from the employer's parking lot. When
the car was found and returned by the police, two guns were found in the
trunk. The police told the employer that the plaintiff had admitted the
guns belonged to him. Based on this information, the employer termi-
nated the plaintiff for violating its policy. The plaintiff contended that the
guns were not really his. This did not matter to the court, which noted
that "Plaintiff simply misses the mark by seizing on the fact that Defen-
dant was mistaken in believing that he had violated the company's
weapon rule. The question is not whether an employer has made an erro-
neous decision; it is whether the decision was made with discriminatory
motive. '46
5. Sex Discrimination/Harassment
In a meticulous application of the Ellerth/Faragher analysis, the Fifth
Circuit in Wyatt v. Hunt Plywood Co.,47 allowed a claim a sexual harass-
ment to go the jury. Wyatt worked for Hunt for about one year. During
her employment, her immediate supervisor sexually harassed her. When
41. Id. at 579.
42. Price v. Federal Express Corp., 283 F.3d 715 (5th Cir. 2002).
43. Id. at 720.
44. Id. at 723.
45. Germany v. Austin Coca-Cola Bottling Co., No. 3:00-CV-2675-P, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6848 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2002, no pet.).
46. Id. at *22.
47. Wyatt v. Hunt Plywood Co., 297 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, No. 02-715,
2003 U.S. LEXIS 1119 (U.S. Feb. 24, 2003).
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she reported the harassment to the next supervisor in the chain of com-
mand, she suffered harassment by that supervisor. When upper manage-
ment learned of her complaints, Hunt terminated both of the supervisors.
The Fifth Circuit dissected Wyatt's employment into specific periods of
time. With respect to the first period, after she complained to the next
ranking supervisor, the court held that Hunt could not establish the El-
lerth/Faragher defense because it "cannot show that Wyatt unreasonably
failed to use the preventive and remedial opportunities provided the em-
ployer."'48 Since Wyatt reported the harassment to the next ranking su-
pervisor and the harassment continued, the jury should only hear that
claim.
In Green v. Administrators of the Tulane Education Fund,49 the court
decided that a demotion might constitute a "tangible employment ac-
tion." Green had a sexual relationship with a co-worker. After the rela-
tionship ended, she was demoted and sexually harassed. A jury awarded
her more than $400,000. Tulane contended that the demotion was not a
"tangible employment action" as a matter of law. The Fifth Circuit dis-
agreed and held that "economic harm" is not a prerequisite to recovery, a
conclusion that continues to muddy the ultimate-employment/adverse-
employment decision waters.50
In La Day v. Catalyst Technology, Inc.,51 the Fifth Circuit followed On-
cale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.52 and held that a same-sex har-
assment case should go to a jury. To establish that same-sex harassment
is based upon gender, evidence that the harasser sought to have sexual
contact with the plaintiff or made same-sex advances to others may be
sufficient. 53 Because there was evidence that the harasser made sexual
advances to plaintiff and others, a jury should ultimately decide whether
the harassment was because of the plaintiff's sex.
The Texas Commission on Human Rights Act also protects an em-
ployee from same-sex harassment according to the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals. In Dillard Department Stores, Inc. v. Gonzales,54 the plaintiff, a
male, suffered severe harassment from his male supervisor. A jury
awarded the plaintiff over five million dollars (reduced after the court
held that the plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
could not survive). Because Dillards had not effectively trained its man-
agers on its sexual harassment policy the court held that the Ellerth/
Faragher affirmative defense was unavailable. As a result, the court
properly instructed the jury to determine whether Dillards had exercised
48. Id. at 414.
49. Green v. Administrators of the Thlane Edu. Fund, 284 F.3d 654 (5th Cir. 2002),
reh'g denied, No. 5.00-30530, 00-31118, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9208 (5th Cir. Apr. 26,
2002).
50. Id. at 655.
51. La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474 (5th Cir. 2002).
52. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 57 (1998).
53. LaDay, 302 F.3d at 480.
54. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Gonzales, 72 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002,
pet. denied).
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reasonable care to prevent the harassment, and there was sufficient evi-
dence to support the jury's answer of "no." 55
In a case of reverse sex discrimination, Coastal Mart, Inc. v. Her-
nandez,56 a jury found that Coastal Mart's area manager terminated the
plaintiff because the area manager wanted a female in the position. As
evidence of sex discrimination, the plaintiff testified that the area man-
ager said that a female could keep the store cleaner and better organized,
that females did a better job managing a store than men in general, and
better than plaintiff specifically. In addition, the area manager allegedly
said that he spent more time in stores managed by attractive women.
Coastal Mart's reason for terminating the plaintiff was related to his fail-
ure to maintain a clean and orderly office and facility. Because the re-
marks indicating a preference for women had some connection with the
reason for termination, the court held that sufficient evidence supported
the jury's verdict.57
In Hatley v. Hilton Hotels Corp.58 the trial court granted judgment as a
matter of law against two female cocktail waitresses. A jury awarded the
two waitresses $150,000 each based on allegations that their supervisors
sexually harassed them and that the employer's "sham" investigation
compelled them to resign. Without detailing the type of conduct at issue,
the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court's determination that the conduct
was not "severe or pervasive. ' 59 The Fifth Circuit also found that the
waitresses introduced sufficient evidence to let the jury decide whether
the employer "had exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct the
harassment, and the plaintiffs had unreasonably failed to take advantage
of preventive or corrective opportunities offered by [the employer]. 6°
Because of evidence in the record that previous complaints of sexual har-
assment had "fallen through the cracks," prior complaints of other wait-
resses of sexual harassment, and the employer's failure to respond to
those complaints, the trial court should not have disturbed the jury's find-
ing of sexual harassment. Because the jury awarded the damages of
$150,000 based on findings of sexual harassment and intentional infliction
of emotional distress, a claim that the Fifth Circuit held should not have
been submitted to the jury, the case was remanded to the trial court for a
new trial limited to the issue of compensatory damages.6'
A frequent factual scenario in sexual harassment cases involves post-
termination complaints of harassment. The plaintiff, an assistant man-
ager, in Prigmore v. Houston Pizza Ventures, Inc.62 was terminated for
55. Id. at 411.
56. Coastal Mart, Inc. v. Hernandez, 76 S.W.3d 691 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christ 2002,
pet. dism'd by agr.).
57. Id. at 697.
58. Hatley v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 308 F.3d at 473 (5th Cir. 2002), reh'g denied, No. 01-
60289, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24504 (5th Cir. Nov. 5, 2002).
59. Id. at 475.
60. Id. at 475, relying on Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
61. Id. at 477.
62. Prigmore v. Houston Pizza Ventures, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 2d 635 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
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her mishandling of cash sales. Following her termination, she contended
that her area manager harassed her by making inappropriate comments,
being flirtatious, and pulling at the hem of her skirt on a couple of occa-
sions. The court analyzed the plaintiff's claim under both prongs (tangi-
ble employment action and hostile environment) of the Ellerth/
Faragher63 framework. Under the tangible employment action, or the
quid pro quo prong, the plaintiff had to establish a causal connection be-
tween her termination and her "acceptance or rejection of the alleged
sexual harassment by the supervisor. '64 Because all of the evidence es-
tablished that the employer terminated her because of the cash shortage,
the court granted summary judgment on the quid pro quo claim.
The court then analyzed the hostile environment claim. Because the
plaintiff could not show that anything the area manager "said or did was
so extreme or severe that it prevented [her] from succeeding in the work-
place or destroyed her opportunity for advancement," her hostile envi-
ronment claim also failed as a matter of law. 65
6. Disability Discrimination
The United States Supreme Court held in US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett66
that in some circumstances an employer may have to ignore the seniority
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement when a qualified individ-
ual with a disability requests a reasonable accommodation under the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Barnett injured his back
while working as a cargo handler for US Airways.67 The company trans-
ferred him to a less strenuous position in the mailroom, which later be-
came subject to a seniority bidding system. Faced with losing his position
because employees with more seniority planned to bid on the position,
Barnett requested that the company accommodate his disability by al-
lowing him to remain in the mailroom position.
US Airways denied the request, and Barnett filed suit under the ADA.
The district court granted US Airways's summary judgment, but the
Ninth Circuit reversed holding that a seniority system was merely a factor
under the ADA's "undue hardship analysis."'68
Justice Breyer, in writing the opinion of the Supreme Court, first struck
down US Airways' contention that an employer may avoid its ADA rea-
sonable accommodations duties by relying on "neutral" work place
rules.69 Because the ADA requires that "preferences" be provided to
qualified individuals with disabilities, an employer cannot refuse an ac-
63. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
64. Pigmore, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 640-41.
65. Id. at 643.
66. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
67. The Court assumed that Barnett was a qualified individual with a disability.
68. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 11.20 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated, 535 U.S. 391
(2002).
69. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 391.
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commodation request merely because the request would violate a rule
that other employees "must obey."'70 The Court next addressed the bur-
den of proof. It found that the plaintiff must first establish that the re-
quested accommodation is, on its face, a reasonable one. Absent a
seniority system, his request to remain in the mailroom, the Court
opined, would be reasonable; however, it also found that a request to
"trump the rules of a seniority system ... will ordinarily be unreasona-
ble. ' '71 Rather than create a bright-line rule, the Court went on to hold
that a plaintiff may offer evidence of "special circumstances" to establish
that a request to bypass a seniority system is reasonable. 72 The situations
when special circumstances may arise, according to the Court, are those
when an employer has retained the discretion to make changes to the
system or the employer has been allowed to ignore the system in the past.
The Court then remanded the case for the trial court to determine
whether such "special circumstances" exist. 73
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion provides one significant practice
point: analyze whether the seniority system is enforceable, i.e., does the
system create a contractual right for an employee to take another
worker's position when that worker quits or leaves the position. In most
collective bargaining agreements, such a contractual right exists. How-
ever, in a non-union setting, when an employer adopts a seniority policy
but states that the policy "is not intended to create a contract," Justice
O'Connor states that such a policy is unenforceable and suggests it may
be reasonable for an employer to then fill a vacant position based upon a
reasonable accommodation request rather than with the employee with
the most seniority.74
The United States Supreme Court again narrowed the definition of a
qualified individual with a disability in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Ken-
tucky, Inc. v. Williams.75 Williams, who worked in an automobile manu-
facturing plant, had a long history of physical conditions that impaired
her ability to perform a variety of assigned tasks. Williams and Toyota
settled a prior lawsuit in 1993 that resulted in Williams returning to work
with a specific accommodation and being assigned to work in a quality
control position. In 1996, Toyota required all of the employees in the
quality control department to be cross-trained. As a result, Williams' du-
ties changed, and Toyota expected her to perform tasks that required her
to hold her arms and hands at shoulder height for several hours a day.
These tasks created a variety of nerve and muscle conditions for Williams
and caused her to request an accommodation of returning to her former
duties. Williams and Toyota disagree on what happened next. Williams
contended that Toyota refused the request, while Toyota contended that
70. Id. at 398.
71. Id. at 403.
72. Id. at 405.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 408-10.
75. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
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Williams simply began missing work. Toyota later terminated Williams
for poor attendance.
The district court granted summary judgment for Toyota, finding that
Williams' condition did not substantially limit the major life activities of
lifting, performing manual tasks, or working.76 To support its finding, the
district court relied on Williams' admission that she could perform her
prior tasks of paint inspection without difficulty, and that her physicians
had not restricted her from performing work of any kind. The Sixth Cir-
cuit reversed because it found that Williams had established that she was
substantially limited in her ability to perform manual tasks. The proof of
such limitation was that she could not perform a class of "manual activi-
ties affecting the ability to perform tasks at work."'77 According to the
Sixth Circuit, Williams established that her conditions "prevented her
from doing the certain tasks in manual assembly line jobs, manual prod-
uct handling jobs, and manual building trade jobs." 78
The Supreme Court framed the question on appeal as "whether the
Sixth Circuit correctly analyzed whether [Williams'] impairments substan-
tially limited [her] in the major life activity of performing manual
tasks."'79 In writing a unanimous decision, Justice O'Connor noted that
the Sixth Circuit jumped the track by focusing on whether Williams'
could perform the manual tasks associated with her work at Toyota.
Rather than look at "occupation-specific tasks," which "have only limited
relevance to the manual task inquiry," the Sixth Circuit should have con-
centrated on the "the types of manual tasks of central importance to peo-
ple's daily lives."' 80 As a result of this error, the Court remanded the case
to the Sixth Circuit.
In another ADA case, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal,81 the United
States Supreme Court held that if an individual's condition poses a "di-
rect threat" to the safety of the individual alone, the employer may law-
fully deny an employment opportunity. Chevron refused to hire
Echazabal (who worked at Chevron's facility for years as an independent
contractor) because of his liver condition, which doctors said would be
exacerbated by continued exposure to certain toxins. Chevron's refusal
led to Echazabal's being laid off by the contractor, resulting in his suit
against Chevron for disability discrimination.
In another unanimous opinion, the Court after examining several prin-
ciples to determine whether Congress left room for the EEOC to exercise
its discretion in setting employment "qualification standards," asked, "If
76. Id. at 191. The district court also rejected Williams' contention that "gardening,
doing housework, and playing with children are major life activities," a decision that Wil-
liams did not appeal. Id.
77. Id. at 192 (quoting Williams v. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., 224 F.3d 840, 843 (6th
Cir. 2000)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 196. The Court noted that the EEOC regulations are silent on this issue.
80. Id. at 201-02.
81. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
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Typhoid Mary had come under the ADA, would a meat packer have been
defenseless if Mary had sued after being turned away?" 8 2 With a re-
sounding "no," the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, again, and upheld
the EEOC's regulation allowing an employer to consider whether the
threat of injury to an employee posed by the employee's own disability in
making its employment decisions.
A plaintiff trying to prove that he or she is limited in a major life activ-
ity continues to be a difficult task. In Aldrup v. Caldera,83 the plaintiff
sought to establish that the "stress and anxiety of having to work with
certain employees" prevented him from working. An expert offered tes-
timony that the plaintiff was limited in a major life activity. The Fifth
Circuit disagreed. It found that the plaintiff's condition only prevented
him from working at one particular workplace and not from a broad class
of jobs. The Fifth Circuit also dismissed an ADA claim, in Mason v.
United Air Lines, Inc.,84 because the plaintiff's evidence that his lower
back injury prevented him from lifting, pushing, and pulling weight did
not establish that the plaintiff could not perform a broad range of other
jobs that did not require such work.
Despite all the cases holding that an individual is not disabled as a mat-
ter of law, an employer must nonetheless assess an employee's limitations
on an individual basis. The plaintiff in Kapche v. City of San Antonio85
was a police officer with insulin dependent diabetes, who was seeking
reinstatement. The city had refused reinstatement, but had not con-
ducted an individualized assessment of the plaintiff's abilities. The Fifth
Circuit held that an employer's failure to assess a plaintiff's abilities
stated a claim for the employee under the ADA. As a result, the Fifth
Circuit implicitly overruled its previous decision in Daugherty v. City of
El Paso86 that allowed employers to exclude insulin-dependent diabetics
from jobs that require driving as an essential function.
In 2002, obesity was alleged to be the fault of fast-food restaurants.8 7
Whose fault obesity is may be under challenge, but according to the
Judge Buchmeyer in the Northern District of Texas, it is not a disability
protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act. In Whaley v. Southwest
Student Transportation L.C.,88 a school bus transportation contractor ter-
minated Whaley after implementing new policies requiring each driver to
fit behind the steering wheel of every bus and to be able to perform cer-
tain evacuation procedures. Whaley, who in the past was given a certain
bus in which she could fit, was too large to fit into every bus. In some
buses, her stomach touched the steering wheel, and she could not walk
82. Id. at 84.
83. Aldrup v. Caldera, 274 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2001).
84. Mason v. United Air Lines, Inc., 274 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2001).
85. Kapche v. City of San Antonio, 304 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2002).
86. Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995).
87. See Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).




down the center aisle of the bus without turning sideways. The court
never addressed whether these job-related policies were discriminatory
because it found that obesity was not a disability under the ADA.
7. Race and National Origin Discrimination
In Ludgood v. Apex Marine Corp.,89 the plaintiff was a member of a
union and employed as a third assistant engineer. In his lawsuit, he al-
leged that the company denied him a promotion to a first or second assis-
tant engineer because of his race and terminated his employment in
retaliation for filing a complaint with the EEOC. As to the promotion
claim, the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory defense was based in
part upon the language of the collective bargaining agreement with the
union, which required job postings to be submitted to the union and for a
job to be filled by the most qualified, unemployed union member. Be-
cause the plaintiff never quit his position as third assistant engineer, the
employer argued that it did not have the discretion to hire the plaintiff.
Despite evidence that the employer retained some discretion in the con-
tract to make hiring decisions for non-union members, the court agreed
with the employer that the plaintiff had not introduced sufficient evi-
dence to suggest that the employer's decision was motivated by race. The
court also dismissed the retaliation claim. The plaintiff's only evidence of
pretext was the timing of the filing of the charge and his termination.
Because approximately one year had lapsed between the filing and the
termination, the court held that no causal link could be established with
such a lapse in time. 90
Whether personnel decisions are made in a subjective and discretion-
ary manner continues to be litigated. In Vance v. City of Nacogdoches,91
the plaintiff sought a promotion from laborer to driver in the City's gar-
bage collection department. The plaintiff requested that the court certify
a class for alleged disparate impact under Title VII. The statistical evi-
dence showed that the selection rate for African-American candidates
was 8.04%, while the rate for white candidates was 12.86%. The court
found that the method used by the expert did consider the number of
qualified applicants as opposed to the number of total applicants. As a
result, the plaintiffs' evidence failed to satisfy the second element of a
disparate impact case, thus the court did not need to address the Rule 23
requirement, and the court refused to certify the class.
8. Age Discrimination
In Tyler v. Union Oil Co. of California,92 Unocal reorganized its do-
mestic operations. As part of the reorganization, it implemented a reduc-
89. Ludgood v. Apex Marine Corp., No. CIV-A.H-99-2760, 2002 WL 31520206 (S.D.
Tex. 2003), appeal dism'd, 311 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 2002).
90. Id. at *5.
91. Vance v. City of Nacogdoches, 198 F. Supp. 2d 858 (E.D. Tex. 2002).
92. Tyler v. Union Oil Co. of Ca., 304 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2002).
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tion in force ("RIF") in which employees who were not offered a position
were given the choice of being placed in a "redeployment pool," from
which Unocal could choose employees for available jobs, or accept termi-
nation pay in exchange for executing a release of all claims.93
The plaintiffs were over age forty and accepted the termination pay.
However, the releases they signed did not comply with the Older Worker
Benefit Protection Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
Despite signing the releases, the plaintiffs filed age discrimination charges
with the EEOC. At trial, the plaintiffs' statistical expert testified that
employees over age fifty were less likely to be promoted and more likely
to be placed in the redeployment pool. The court also found that the
decision maker's failure to keep documentation of the plaintiffs' selection
for the RIF and his admission that he was not personally familiar with the
plaintiffs' job performance created fact issues for the jury.94
In Palasota v. Haggar Clothing Co.,95 Haggar lost a major account with
Dillard's Department Stores, which was a large customer for the plaintiff,
who was a sales associate for Haggar. About six months later, Haggar
terminated the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed an age discrimination lawsuit.
At trial, the jury agreed that the plaintiff was a victim of age discrimina-
tion and awarded him back pay in the amount of $842,218.96.96 Haggar's
post-trial motion for judgment was granted.
In considering the evidence presented at trial, the court concluded that
it was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. The plaintiff offered a
wide array of potentially probative evidence. First, there were age-based
comments from Haggar's managers indicating that: (1) the sales force was
"ageing" and "graying;" (2) Haggar needed "racehorses, not
plowhorses;" and (3) the plaintiff was from the "old school of selling."'97
The court agreed with Haggar that these comments were too "ambigu-
ous" to support a jury verdict.98 After losing the Dillard's account, Hag-
gar also created a new position called a "Retail Marketing Associate."
The plaintiff referred to this program as Haggar's "youthanization." 99
The court found that the plaintiff's attempt to compare his treatment to
retail marketing associates was not probative of age discrimination be-
cause those employees were not in "nearly identical" circumstances as
the plaintiff. Because none of the evidence presented at trial was proba-
tive of age discrimination, the court held that the claim failed as a matter
of law. 100
93. Id. at 383.
94. Id. at 397.
95. Palasota v. Haggar Clothing Co., No. 3:00-CV-1295-G, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11505 (N.D. Tex. June 26, 2002).
96. Id. at *4.
97. Id. at *11.
98. Id.
99. Id. at *14.




In EEOC v. TCIM Services, Inc.,10 1 the EEOC sued a telemarketing
company on behalf of a recruiter (Boyd, an African-American) who was
employed for only three months. The EEOC alleged that Boyd refused
to follow an instruction by her supervisor, also an African-American, not
to hire too many "African-Americans." 102 TCIM hired Boyd to help staff
a new call center. As part of her duties, Boyd interviewed applicants.
During her three-month tenure, TCIM counseled Boyd repeatedly to act
more professionally in interviews, to stay out of business issues unrelated
to her duties as the recruiter, and not to embroil herself in disputes with
other associates. After Boyd asked an applicant with five children, "Do
you know what birth control is?" TCIM made the decision to termi-
nate. 10 3 The court granted TCIM's motion for summary judgment in
large part because of a tape-recorded conversation between Boyd and
her supervisor soon after the termination. In that conversation, Boyd
never hints that the she believed the reason for her termination was retal-
iatory and appears to admit that her conduct was inappropriate. While
the record is silent on this issue, the fact that the phone call was recorded
persuaded the court that Boyd's allegation of retaliation was trumped up.
In Raggs v. Mississippi Power & Light Co.,'0 4 the Fifth Circuit had to
decide whether an employer laid off a black employee and failed to re-
hire him because of his race or in retaliation for making prior complaints
of harassment. For employment lawyers, the Fifth Circuit's analysis of
the layoff decision is noteworthy. Mississippi Power & Light Co.
("MP&L") made the decision to reduce the number of its journeyman
employees because of increased competition. To select those who would
be laid off, MP&L ranked employees on a scale of 1-5 in the following
categories: (1) present job performance; (2) job-related personal charac-
teristics; (3) special skills; (4) potential; and (5) other job-related fac-
tors.10 5 MP&L ranked Raggs as below average or unsatisfactory in all
categories except special skills, for which he rated as average.' 0 6 Because
of his relative low score, Raggs was chosen for the layoff. Raggs' evi-
dence of discrimination or retaliation in the layoff selection was that his
supervisor gave him "an extraordinarily low and undeserved performance
score."'01 7 Raggs did present evidence of pretext: (1) MP&L assigning
him inferior equipment; (2) his low lay off evaluation in comparison to
previous performance appraisals; and (3) an increased level of scrutiny
applied to him. This evidence, however, was not enough. The Fifth Circuit
concluded that "evidence of pretext alone may, but will not always, sus-
tain a fact-finder's inference of unlawful discrimination" and upheld the
101. EEOC v. TCIM Servs., Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 817 (E.D. Tex. 2001).
102. Id. at 818.
103. Id. at 820.
104. Raggs v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 278 F.3d 463 (5th Cir. 2002).
105. Id. at 466.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 469.
1562 [Vol. 56
EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW
trial court's decision to dismiss the retaliatory/discriminatory layoff claim
as a matter of law at the close of the evidence.108 For practioners, the
Raggs decision suggests that a watered-down version of the "pretext
plus" standard may still exist in the Fifth Circuit. The trial court decided
as a matter of law that Raggs had not carried his ultimate burden of es-
tablishing discrimination.' 09 By affirming that Raggs had not presented
evidence of pretext, the Fifth Circuit is suggesting that at the summary
judgment stage, a trial court may decide as a matter of law that "pretext"
evidence is not the right quality to sustain a jury's finding, an approach
that suggests that the evidence of pretext should have some connection
with the plaintiff's protected trait.
Courts continue to struggle with the evidentiary significance between
the timing of protected activity, i.e., a complaint of harassment, and an
adverse employment action. Last year, the United States Supreme Court,
in Clark County School District v. Breeden,110 signaled that if there is a
significant lapse of time between the protected act and the adverse action,
a retaliation claim may be dismissed as a matter of law. However, in Gee
v. Principi,111 the plaintiff complained of harassment and then transferred
to another department. Two years later, she requested another transfer.
This time, the supervisor against whom she had made the complainant
rejected the transfer, and the plaintiff claimed that the denial of the trans-
fer was retaliatory. The Fifth Circuit held that the two-year lapse of time
between the complaint and the retaliatory act did not defeat her prima
facie case. When the "cat's paw," a person acting with retaliatory motive,
influences a decision maker, "the causal link between the protected activ-
ity and ultimate employment decision remains intact. ' '112
A frequent fact in retaliation cases is the quick resignation of an em-
ployee who has engaged in protected activity. In Contreras v. Waffle
House, Inc.,113 the plaintiff made complaints that a co-worker was sexu-
ally harassing her. The court dismissed the plaintiff's sexual harassment
claims because the plaintiff had not provided sufficient notice to the em-
ployer of the harassment. As to her claim of retaliation, the court ana-
lyzed whether her resignation was reasonable. Because she did not
provide the employer with sufficient time to investigate her claims, her
resignation was simply unreasonable, and thus, the court granted the em-
ployer's motion for summary judgment on the retaliation claim as well.
108. Id. at 470.
109. The case does not indicate whether MP&L filed a motion for summary judgment.
Id. at 465.
110. Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001).
111. Gee v. Principi, 289 F.3d 342 (5th Cir. 2002).
112. Id. at 346.
113. Contreras v. Waffle House, Inc., No. 3:01-CV-0701-P, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12376
(N.D. Tex. July 9, 2002).
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B. WORKERS' COMPENSATION RETALIATION
Juries continue to have little sympathy for Wal-Mart. In the past, juries
have concluded that Wal-Mart's security department was too zealous. In
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee,114 the jury awarded $1.65 million because
loss prevention employees invaded an employee's privacy when con-
ducting an investigation of suspected employee theft. In Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Amos,11 5 Wal-Mart terminated a loss prevention employee for
peering over a bathroom stall to investigate a suspected shoplifter. Wal-
Mart had warned the plaintiff months earlier not to use a mirror to look
into dressing rooms where customers were trying on clothes. Despite
Wal-Mart's articulated reason for the termination, a jury found that Wal-
Mart terminated the plaintiff because of her previous workers' compensa-
tion claim.116 The court then analyzed whether the evidence introduced
at trial was legally sufficient to support the jury's award. The court held
that the following facts were not legally sufficient: Wal-Mart's efforts to
return employees to a light-duty position as quickly as possible; a com-
ment made two years earlier with possible animus but not related to the
termination decision; statements of concern that the plaintiff's return to
work could exacerbate her injury; and a bonus program which benefited
store managers and was impacted by workers' compensation losses.
However, the court held that the inconsistent discipline for loss preven-
tion employees violating standard operating procedures, and a close
proximity in time between the injury and the termination created a fact
issue and that was sufficient to support the jury's award. 117 The Amos
case also suggests that the stray-remark doctrine is alive and well in Texas
workers' compensation retaliation/discrimination cases.
In worker's compensation discrimination cases, the employer's "atti-
tude" is often at issue. The court in Lozoya v. Air Systems Components,
Inc.,1 8 stated that legally justified conduct is not probative of discrimina-
tion under Texas Labor Code, section 451.001. For example, the fact that
an employer contested the underlying worker's compensation case and
conducted surveillance does not prove that an employer's decision to dis-
charge an employee is false or motivated by discriminatory animus. Be-
cause Lozoya was terminated pursuant to an absence policy, which
requires termination for any employee who does not return from a leave
of absence within 180 days, and he offered no probative evidence to the
contrary, the court granted the employer's motion for summary
judgment.
114. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 74 S.W.3d 634 (Ark. 2002).
115. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Amos, 79 S.W.3d 178 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no
pet.).
116. Id. at 191.
117. Id.
118. Lozoya v. Air Sys. Components, Inc., 81 S.W.3d 344 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2002, no
pet.)
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C. TRADITIONAL LABOR LAW
In BE & K Construction Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,119 the
United States Supreme Court had to determine when an employer can
file a lawsuit against a union without running afoul of the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA"). °20 The employer sued several unions in fed-
eral district court alleging that the union's lobbying, litigation, and other
concerted activities violated federal labor and antitrust laws. The em-
ployer, who entered into a contract to modernize a California steel mill,
was non-union, and became the target of unions in the area. The tactics
used by the unions included lobbying for stricter emissions standards, en-
couraging strikes by employees of subcontractors, filing claims in Califor-
nia state court alleging violations of the state health and safety codes,
hand billing, and picketing. The employer responded in kind with a law-
suit in federal court.
Ultimately, each of the employer's causes of action was dismissed via
summary judgment or by voluntary dismissal. Two unions lodged charges
against the employer with the NLRB contending that the employer's law-
suit violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.121
The employer argued that it filed the federal lawsuit because it be-
lieved that the Union's conduct was not protected by the NLRA. The
National Labor Relations Board found, however, that the employer's
lawsuit was based on an improper motive relying on the fact that none of
the employer's claims survived summary judgment, and the Sixth Circuit
enforced the Board's order.' 22
For the Supreme Court, the First Amendment right to petition the gov-
ernment may be restrained only with evidence of a "sham." To rise to the
level of a sham, a petition must be objectively baseless and made with an
illegal motive determined subjectively. 123 The threshold question was
"whether the Board may declare that an unsuccessful retaliatory lawsuit
violates the NLRA even if reasonably based.' 24 To answer this "difficult
constitutional question," the Court first noted that the First Amendment
is not conditioned on "successful" petitions to the government; the First
Amendment must be interpreted to allow "unsuccessful" petitions as
well.125 In this case, there was evidence that the employer's motive in
filing suit against the unions was the employer's belief that the union's
conduct was unprotected. "If such a belief is both subjectively genuine
and objectively reasonable, then declaring the resulting suit illegal affects
119. BE & K Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 536 U.S. 516 (2002).
120. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (1998).
121. Id.
122. BE 8K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 246 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 536 U.S. 516
(2002).
123. The Court followed the approach used in the antitrust context from its decision in
Profl Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
124. NLRB, 536 U.S. at 516.
125. Id. at 520.
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genuine petitioning." 12 6 The Court also minimized the employer's "ill
will" to the unions, relied upon heavily by the Board, by simply finding
that "[d]isputes between adverse parties may generate such ill will that
recourse to the courts becomes the only legal and practical means to re-
solve the situation."' 1 7 After posing all of these interesting questions, the
Court switched gears and admittedly side-stepped the First Amendment
issues by focusing on whether section 8(a)(1), as written, applied to the
employer's conduct. The Court held that "[b]ecause there is nothing in
the statutory text indicating that section 158(a)(1) must be read to reach
all reasonably based but unsuccessful suits filed with a retaliatory pur-
pose," struck down the Board's standard. 28
D. WAGE AND HOUR
Though Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act over half of a
century ago, several unsettled questions remain and the statute is coming
to life again as some firms and attorneys are targeting large employers in
collective action cases. One such unsettled issue is whether an FLSA case
can be removed from state court to federal court. In Shaw v. CF Data
Corp.,t 29 the Northern District Court of Texas refused to remand such a
case and joined the majority of courts permitting removal. 30 The Shaw
decision is also noteworthy because of the practical lesson it teaches. If
you remove a case with both state and federal claims, do not be surprised
if the federal court remands only the state claims, resulting in litigation in
two forums. As noted by Judge Fish in Shaw, "[a]llowing [the gender
discrimination] claim to remain here would permit the federal tail to wag
the state dog."'13 1
As an example of a collective action case, Judge Lynn of the Northern
District of Texas granted a plaintiff's motion to allow nationwide notice
to other similarly situated plaintiffs in a case seeking unpaid overtime
compensation. In Barnett v. Countrywide Credit Industries,'32 the plain-
tiff contended that she should act as the class representative for other
employees and requested that the court order notice be provided to simi-
larly-situated employees through bulletin board postings and mailing no-
tices to employees' home addresses. The court ordered the employer to
provide a list of names and last-known addresses of the employees for
notification and to allow them the opportunity to opt-in to the lawsuit.
Because a collective-action under the FLSA requires each claimant to
affirmatively opt-in to the lawsuit, the task of locating other plaintiffs is
126. Id. at 533-34.
127. Id. at 534.
128. Id. at 536.
129. Shaw v. CF Data Corp., No. 3:01-CV-1517-G, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16651 (N.D.
Tex. Oct. 15, 2001).
130. Id. at *6.
131. Id.
132. Barnett v. Countrywide Credit Indus., No. 3:01-CV-1182-M, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9099 (N.D. Tex. May 21, 2002).
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daunting and expensive. A "class-action" on the other hand works differ-
ently. Once a class is certified, then a class member must "opt-out" to not
be a party to the lawsuit.
A group of employees in Houston attempted to certify a class action
against Wal-Mart alleging that Wal-Mart had a policy of requiring em-
ployees to work "off the clock." Rather than use the collective-active
procedure under the FLSA, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lopez,133 counsel
successful convinced the trial court to certify a class of 350,000 employees
suing for breach of contract for requiring employees to work through
meal and break times without pay. After the certification, Wal-Mart filed
an interlocutory appeal to challenge the appropriateness of the class. The
court first analyzed whether common question of law and fact
predominated over any questions affecting individual members. Despite
having a policy in its handbook, the court of appeals held that determin-
ing whether a contract existed between Wal-Mart and each employee was
an individualized inquiry "regarding the formation of 350,000 contracts,"
which predominate over any common issues. 134 Further, determining
whether Wal-Mart breached any such contract would also involve an indi-
vidualized inquiry. The court also rejected the employees' argument, by
analogy, that a suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act does not require
individualized assessment when an employer has failed to keep adequate
time records. 135 The court dismissed this argument by holding that a
FLSA claim was simply not before it. For these reasons, the court held
that the trial court abused its discretion in certifying a class.
In Berry v. Excel Group, Inc.,136 the plaintiff sought to have his travel
per diem compensation to be included in regular wages. If successful, the
employer would be required to adjust his rate of compensation, which
would increase the plaintiff's overtime compensation. The Fifth Circuit
followed a long-standing rule that as long as travel per diems are "reason-
able," the compensation should not be included in an employee's regular
rate of pay.137 Because the expense per diem paid to the plaintiff in the
amount of $150 per week was not unreasonable, the court granted the
employer's motion for summary judgment. However, in Picton v. Excel
Group, Inc.,138 the trial court denied Excel's motion for summary judg-
ment on the same issue, although the per diem was only $100 per week.
The court rejected Excel's contention that it should be able to approxi-
mate per diem payments on a group basis, rather than taking into an ac-
count an individual's circumstances. 139
133. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lopez, 93 S.W.3d 548 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2002, no pet.).
134. Id. at 557.
135. Id. at 559-60.
136. Berry v. Excel Group, Inc., 288 F.3d 252 (5th Cir. 2002).
137. Id. at 253.
138. Picton v. Excel Group, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 706 (E.D. Tex. 2001).
139. Id. at 712-13.
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Another issue developing for employers with manufacturing operations
is whether the time spent donning and doffing uniforms is compensable.
In Huntington v. Asarco, Inc.,140 the court held that section 3(o) of the
FLSA prohibits employees from attempting to collect through the FLSA
what was not obtained at the bargaining table. Therefore, the employer
was not required to pay employees for time spent putting on and chang-
ing out of uniforms.
E. FAMILY LEAVE
The law in the Fifth Circuit for several years has been that an employee
is entitled to only twelve weeks of FMLA leave, even if the employer
does not provide proper notice of the leave as required by United States
Department of Labor Regulations. The Supreme Court in Ragsdale v.
Wolverine World Wide, Inc.,141 adopted the same rationale-that the
DOL cannot, through regulation, increase the number of weeks of leave
mandated by Congress. Ragsdale worked at a Wolverine factory and was
granted a 30-week leave of absence related to surgery and radiation ther-
apy related to Hodgkin's disease. However, Wolverine did not notify
Ragsdale that any of her leave would count as FMLA leave. In a 5 to 4
decision, Justice Kennedy wrote that the "challenged regulation is invalid
because it alters the FMLA's cause of action in a fundamental way: It
relieves employees of the burden of proving any real impairment of their
rights and resulting prejudice."' 142
A judge in the Eastern District of Louisiana has certified a question in
Briones v. Genuine Parts Co. 143 to the Fifth Circuit, which will be decided
in the next Survey period. In Briones, the trial court determined that the
FMLA was broad enough to require an employer to provide leave to an
employee who must care for healthy children while the spouse cares for a
sick child.144 Rather than proceed to trial because of a "controlling"
question of law, the trial court granted the employer's request to allow an
immediate appeal to the Fifth Circuit. 145 The certified question to the
Fifth Circuit is whether the FMLA requires an employer to provide leave
for a parent to care for healthy children while the other spouse tends to a
sick child. Practitioners should monitor the Fifth Circuit's decision be-
cause of its potential impact on leave of absence policies.
F. OTHER SUPREME COURT CASES
In a decision that might restrict damage awards in all employment
cases involving illegal immigrants, the Supreme Court, in Hoffman Plastic
140. Huntington v. Asarco, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10619 (N.D. Tex. June 13,
2002).
141. Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 122 S. Ct. 1155 (2002).
142. Id. at 1162.
143. Broines v. Genuine Parts Co., No. 01-1792, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17552 (E.D. La.
Sep. 17, 2002).
144. Id. at *2.
145. Id. at *34.
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Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board,146 decided that an
illegal immigrant is not entitled to an award of back pay in cases arising
under the section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act. 147 After
determining that Hoffman Plastics terminated Jose Castro because of his
union organizing activities, the parties proceeded to a compliance hearing
before an AL. At the hearing, Castro admitted that he was not legally
authorized to work in the United States.148 The ALJ found that Castro
could not be awarded back pay; however, four years after the ALJ's deci-
sion, the Board reversed the decision and held that back pay was an ap-
propriate remedy, 149 a decision upheld by the Court of Appeals. 150 The
Court analyzed the IRCA151 and determined that the IRCA's command
to employers to terminate illegal workers establishes a federal immigra-
tion policy, which would be jeopardized by awarding back pay "in a case
like this."' 152 The Court's analysis should apply in any case in which an
illegal worker is seeking back pay or front pay in an employment discrim-
ination suit.
In Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran et aL,153 the Supreme Court
had to decide whether ERISA preempted Illinois' HMO Act.1 54
Deborah Moran's employer sponsored an employee welfare plan covered
by ERISA to provide "medically necessary" services via a contract with
Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. Rush denied Moran's requests for a certain
procedure as being unnecessary.
Moran sued Rush in Illinois state court to compel Rush to comply with
an Illinois statute that requires an HMO to approve of a service once an
independent medical review determines that questioned procedure is
necessary. Rush removed the case to federal court contending that the
Illinois statute was preempted by ERISA. The district court found that
the claim was preempted. However, the Seventh Circuit reversed and
held that the Illinois statute was a law regulating insurance and therefore
was not preempted. 55
At issue was whether Illinois' HMO Act "relates to" an employee ben-
efit, in which case the ERISA preemption would apply, or whether it is a
law "which regulates insurance, banking, or securities."1 56 Justice Souter
summarized the issue as follows: "In trying to extrapolate congressional
intent in a case like this, when congressional language seems simultane-
ously to preempt everything and hardly anything, we 'have no choice' but
146. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 535 U.S. 137, 122
S. Ct. 1275 (2002).
147. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1998).
148. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 306 N.L.R.B. 100 (1992).
149. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1998).
150. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 208 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
151. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1999).
152. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 1284.
153. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 122 S. Ct. 2151 (2002).
154. 215 I11. Comp. Stat., 125/4-10 (2000).
155. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2153.
156. Id. at 2158 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)).
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to temper the assumption that 'the ordinary meaning ... accurately ex-
presses the legislative purpose."1 5 7
Applying a "common-sense inquiry," which analyzes whether the state
law regulates the "primary elements of an insurance contract," the Court
found that Rush was both a medical provider and an insurer, and there-
fore subject to a state law regulating insurance. 158 Rush, however, con-
tinued to assert that the law should be preempted because the state law
provided remedies not otherwise available under ERISA. Specifically,
Rush urged the Court to strike down the statute because it supplanted
ERISA's "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review when making
medical plan interpretations. The Court held that the Illinois statute did
not provide a new cause of action because ERISA also allows for a re-
view of a decision of what would constitute a "medically necessary" pro-
cedure under the terms of a policy in an action for benefits under
§ 1132(a) and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.' 59
In Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson,160 the Su-
preme Court affirmed a Ninth Circuit decision preventing a health plan
from seeking restitution in an ERISA action from a participant who had
received benefits from the plan and then settled a private tort claim
against a third party. Knudson was severely injured in a car accident.
The cost of her medical care was borne by Great-West pursuant to the
terms of a health plan sponsored by Knudson's husband's employer. As
is common with most employer sponsored plans, Great-West was entitled
to a lien "upon any recovery, whether by settlement, judgment or other-
wise" received by the beneficiary. 161 Great-West sued in federal court
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under ERISA to enforce the re-
imbursement provision of the plan by requiring the Knudsons to pay the
plan for her prior medical expenses. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary
judgment for the Knudsons holding that reimbursements made to a bene-
ficiary of an insurance plan by a third party is not "equitable relief" au-
thorized by ERISA § 502(a)(3).162 In 5 to 4 decision, written by Justice
Scalia, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision. Justice
Scalia's opinion focuses on the type of relief sought by Great-West. In
sum, the Court held that Great-West was merely suing for money dam-
ages based on a breach of contract, which is a legal, not an equitable
remedy. 163 Though identifying the "equitable" remedies, such as restitu-
tion, which would provide the same relief, the Court nevertheless holds
that ERISA does not provide Great-West with an avenue to seek a legal
157. Id. at 2159 (quoting Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740
(1985)).
158. Id. (quoting Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211
(1979)).
159. Id. at 2167.
160. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
161. Id. at 207.
162. Id. at 221 (citing Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994 ed.)).
163. Id.
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remedy of money damages.164 While the Knudson decision has been
touted as body-blow to insurance companies' ability to recapture benefits
paid to a beneficiary who then recovers via a settlement with an alleged
tortfeasor,165 other courts have been able to distinguish the rationale to
allow an insurance company to seek restitution under § 502(a)(3). 166
III. COMMON LAW CLAIMS
A. EMPLOYMENT AT WILL
During the Survey period, the plaintiffs' bar continued its attempt to
whittle away at the doctrine of employment at will, 167 albeit relatively
unsuccessfully. For example, in Midland Judicial District Community Su-
pervision & Corrections Department v. Jones,'68 the plaintiff filed suit for
wrongful termination after her job was eliminated, and asserted that she
was not employed at will because a memorandum that she received when
she started employment contained language promising pay raises in the
future. The memorandum stated the plaintiff's starting monthly salary
and quarterly pay increases that she could expect to receive during her
first year of employment. However, the memorandum also contained
disclaimers that the salary figures were contingent upon her future per-
formance evaluations, as well as availability of funding from the county.
The Texas Supreme Court held that the disclaimers in the memorandum
indicated that the plaintiff's employment was at will. The court reiterated
long standing law that employment at-will is presumed unless the em-
ployer "unequivocally indicate[s] a definite intent to be bound not to ter-
minate the employee except under clearly specified circumstances."' 169
This same reasoning supported the Dallas Court of Appeals' affirma-
tion of summary judgment for the employer in Travis-Owen v. IVP Care,
Inc.170 In this case, the employee was discharged shortly after a promo-
tion to sales representative. She sued for wrongful termination alleging
that the chief executive officer assured her that she would always have a
job, even if the sales job did not work out. Citing to Brown, the Dallas
Court of Appeals ruled that the CEO's statements, even if true, were too
general and nonspecific as a matter of law to form the basis of a wrongful
164. Id.
165. See U.S. Supreme Court Decision-Great-West Life & Annuity v. Knudson, avail-
able at http://www.ngsamerican.com/n020306.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
166. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Randall Brown, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1376
(M.D. Ga. 2002).
167. Absent a specific agreement to the contrary, the employment relationship in Texas
is at-will, meaning that either the employer or the employee may terminate the employ-
ment relationship at any time with or without any reason; see generally Fed. Express Corp.
v. Dutschman, 846 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. 1993); East Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex.
70, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888).
168. Midland Judicial Dist. Cmty. Supervision & Corrections Dept. v. Jones, 92 S.W.3d
486 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam).
169. Id. at 487 (quoting Montgomery Cty. Hosp. Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501, 502
(Tex. 1998)).
170. Travis-Owen v. IVP Care, Inc., No. 05-00-01989-CV, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 2204
(Tex. App.-Dallas Mar. 27, 2002, no pet. h.).
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termination claim.' 71 Similarly, in Dodd v. City of Beverly Hills,172 the
Waco Court of Appeals ruled that the City of Beverly Hills did not
wrongfully terminate the plaintiff after a city official told the plaintiff that
he would not be terminated over the city's anti-nepotism policy as long as
the city was satisfied with his job performance. 173
Jones, Travis Owen, and Dodd all uphold the well-established doctrine
of employment at will, a doctrine that is likely to stay entrenched in Texas
law well into the future. Because of this, employees will often look to
their employee manual for evidence that will overcome the presumption
of employment at will. Such was the case in Matagorda County Hospital
District v. Burwell,174 where the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals upheld
the jury's verdict in favor of the employee on a breach of contract claim.
The court reasoned that the city's employee manual limited, in a mean-
ingful way, the employer's right to terminate its employees because the
manual contained specific language that stated employees could only be
terminated for their inability to perform their job or for serious violations
of hospital policy.' 75
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals' decision in Burwell runs counter
to another case decided in 2002. In Herod v. Baptist Foundation of
Texas,176 the Eastland Court of Appeals upheld summary judgment in
favor of the employer on a wrongful termination claim, even though the
employer failed to follow the three-step disciplinary process contained in
its employee handbook. What made the difference in this case was the
presence of specific contract disclaimer language in the employee hand-
book, which contained a provision that the plaintiff's employment was at-
will. 177
It is a rare occasion when the employer turns the table and sues a re-
signing employee for wrongful termination of an employment contract.
This was the case in Air America Jet Charter, Inc. v. Lawhon,178 where the
employer and the employee, a pilot, entered into an agreement whereby
the employee agreed to stay with the company for one year after he ob-
tained his Learjet certification if the company agreed to give him free
training as a Learjet captain and raise his pay $750 per month. Lawhon
received the training and the pay raise, but resigned his employment only
six months after receiving his Learjet certification. The Houston Court of
Appeals for the Fourteenth District, reversed summary judgment in favor
of the employee/pilot, holding that the company's specific promises made
171. Id. at *14-15.
172. Dodd v. City of Beverly Hills, 8 S.W.3d 509 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, pet. denied).
173. Id. at 514.
174. Matagorda County Hosp. Dist. v. Burwell, 94 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2002, pet. denied).
175. Id. at 86.
176. Herod v. Baptist Found. of Tex., 89 S.W.3d 689 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2002, no pet.
h.).
177. Id. at 694.
178. Air Am. Jet Charter, Inc. v. Lawhon, 93 S.W.3d 441 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2002, no pet. h.).
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in exchange for the employee's promise to remain employed for a year
formed a binding employment contract notwithstanding the fact that the
employee was initially hired as an at-will employee.179
B. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Unable to overcome the bar of employment at will, many times a dis-
gruntled employee will assert tort claims that exist irrespective of the con-
tractual relationship between an employer and an employee. The tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") is a good example of
this phenomenon. Although the Texas Supreme Court, in a number of
past opinions, has cautioned trial courts to view IIED claims in an em-
ployment context with strict scrutiny, 180 appellate courts continue to con-
front quite a few lIED claims arising in employment cases.
The Texas Supreme Court was faced with yet another lIED claim in
Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sears,181 wherein the plain-
tiff, an independent insurance agent, sued his principal, an insurance
company, for lIED after the company allegedly botched an investigation
of a kickback scheme that the plaintiff first reported to the company. Af-
ter the plaintiff was terminated, the company allegedly tried to have his
insurance license revoked and the results of the investigation turned over
to the Texas Department of Insurance, as well as several federal govern-
ment agencies. Unpersuaded by the evidence of a botched investigation,
the Texas Supreme Court reversed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff
and rendered judgment in favor of the employer, holding that the com-
pany's actions, while unpleasant for the plaintiff, were not extreme and
outrageous as a matter of law. 182 Specifically, the court observed that
insurance companies must have some latitude to discover and eliminate
insurance fraud and alleged improper conduct without worrying whether
its behavior is outrageous. Similarly, the company had a reasonable be-
lief that the plaintiff was involved in suspicious dealings, and making gov-
ernment authorities aware of its investigation and findings is not extreme
and outrageous. 183
Holding to the Texas Supreme Court's mandate to closely review IIED
claims, several courts of appeals have rendered opinions in favor of the
employer in IIED claims. In Haynes and Boone, L.L.P. v. Chason,184 the
179. Id. at 444.
180. See, e.g., City of Midland v. O'Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 217 (Tex. 2000) (holding that
the employer's decision to revise job descriptions or change compensation is not evidence
of extreme and outrageous conduct); Brewerton v. Dalrynple, 997 S.W.2d 212, 216 (Tex.
1999) (holding that negative comments in professor's file, denial of tenure, restricting pro-
fessor's speech, and assigning an excessive course load is not extreme and outrageous con-
duct); Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Franco, 971 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Tex. 1998)
(holding that wrongful termination is not extreme and outrageous conduct).
181. Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sears, 84 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. 2002).
182. Id. at 611.
183. Id. at 612.




Tyler Court of Appeals reversed a jury verdict in favor of an employee's
wife, whose nude torso was displayed in a public hearing which was con-
vened to determine whether her husband should be fired from his job
with the City of Athens because he took pictures of his wife with a city-
owned camera. The court held that the conduct of the attorney was not
outrageous as a matter of law.185 Similarly, in Dillard Department Stores,
Inc. v. Gonzales,186 the El Paso Court of Appeals reversed a jury verdict
in favor of the employee on an lIED claim. In this case there was evi-
dence that the plaintiff's supervisor hugged him, rubbed his back and
shoulders, called him pet names, and, in the presence of co-workers,
made off-color remarks implying that the plaintiff was a homosexual. As
unpleasant as the work environment may have been for that particular
plaintiff, the court found that the supervisor's behavior was not outra-
geous enough to sustain an lIED claim.187
In Larson v. Family Violence and Sexual Assault Prevention Center of
South Texas,188 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals upheld summary
judgment in favor of the employer where there was evidence that the
Center's president wrote a letter to the plaintiff demanding that she re-
turn property of the Center and spoke to the news media about allega-
tions of financial mismanagement of the Center. This evidence, the court
explained, is not the type of outrageous conduct that supports an lIED
claim. Importantly, the court found that the Center's president was
merely exercising her rights and there was no evidence that she was moti-
vated to intentionally cause emotional distress upon the plaintiff.189
Despite the supreme court's admonitions to closely scrutinize IIED
claims, several courts of appeals have sustained lIED claims in favor of
employees during the Survey period. In Jackson v. Creditwatch, Inc.,190
the Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment in favor of
the employer after finding that the employer's directions to a co-em-
ployee to evict the plaintiff from her apartment constituted outrageous
conduct. 191 Similarly, in Hoffman LaRoche v. Zeltwanger,192 the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals upheld a jury verdict for the plaintiff on her
lIED claim. While the court recognized that lIED claims are to be nar-
rowly construed, it nonetheless determined that evidence of the employer
fostering an environment that tolerated vulgar sexual jokes, failing to fol-
low its sexual harassment policy, requiring the plaintiff to go to her super-
visor's house for her performance evaluation, and other similar conduct
185. Id. at 314.
186. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Gonzales, 72 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002,
pet. denied).
187. Id. at 406.
188. Larson v. Family Violence and Sexual Assault Prevention Ctr. of S. Tex., 64 S.W.3d
506 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. denied).
189. Id. at 516.
190. Jackson v. Creditwatch, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 397 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).
191. Id. at 407-08.
192. Hoffman LaRoche v. Zeltwanger, 69 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002,
pet. granted).
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was enough evidence to support the jury's verdict. 193
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola,194 once again the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals affirmed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on an lIED
claim. In this case, a supervisor was terminated after he allegedly sexu-
ally harassed some store employees. There was evidence that the com-
pany's investigation of the sexual harassment charges against the plaintiff
was incomplete and biased. The jury also heard evidence that the com-
pany did not uniformly apply disciplinary actions and that one employee
was coached to falsify a statement implicating the plaintiff.195
The foregoing cases plainly demonstrate that the courts of appeals will
go both ways in IIED cases. It appears, therefore, that despite the su-
preme court's directive to review lIED claims in employment cases with
requisite skepticism, the tort of lIED, with the right set of facts, is alive
and well in Texas.
C. DEFAMATION
Defamation is another tort that employees often assert in order to
plead around the doctrine of employment at will. There were few re-
ported defamation cases during the Survey period. However, one case in
particular, Minyard Food Stores, Inc. v. Goodman,196 resolved a common
dilemma that employers face when investigating employee misconduct: Is
an employer vicariously liable for defamation when a supervisor allegedly
defames another employee in statements made to the company's investi-
gator during an investigation of the supervisor's misconduct?
In Goodman, a grocery store manager lied about whether he had
kissed a store employee in an investigation of allegations of sexual mis-
conduct against him by a company investigator. The store manager told
the investigator that he had kissed the store employee several times. The
store employee, denying that she had ever kissed the store manager, sued
the grocery store for defamation and asserted that the store was vicari-
ously liable for the store manager's false statements because he was act-
ing within the course and scope of his employment when he made false
statements to the company's investigator.
These facts place the employer between a rock and a hard spot. On the
one hand, the employer is obligated to investigate claims of employee
misconduct or else face liability for failing to ferret out and correct un-
lawful discrimination. 197 However, on the other hand, if a supervisor ut-
ters a defaming statement about another employee during the
investigation, the company is potentially vicariously liable for defamation
193. Id. at 646-47.
194. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola, 64 S.W.3d 524 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2001, no pet.).
195. Id. at 541.
196. Minyard Food Stores, Inc. v. Goodman, 80 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. 2002).
197. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (holding that an




if the supervisor made the statement during the course and scope of his
employment. Of course, a supervisor will always be acting within the
course and scope of his employment during a misconduct investigation
because the supervisor's job requires that he or she cooperate with the
investigator.
Goodman resolves this dilemma in favor of the employer. Critical to
the Texas Supreme Court's reasoning, it found that the supervisor lied to
the company's investigator, and that lying to the investigator does not
further the company's business or accomplish an act for which the store
manager was employed. In other words, he was not lying for the com-
pany.198 While it may seem that Goodman boils down to a semantic ar-
gument over the proper use of prepositions, the distinction between the
words "to" and "for" makes a world of difference for employers faced
with claims of vicarious liability when its supervisors lie about employees
during the course of a work place investigation.
Mars, Inc. v. Gonzalez,199 involved a potential nightmare for any em-
ployer that uses electronic mail as a communication tool. In Gonzalez,
two independent contractors of Mars, dissatisfied by the way they were
treated by a Mars employee, electronically mailed two allegedly defama-
tory messages, one of which was received by approximately 150 recipi-
ents, some of whom deleted it, but others of whom forwarded the
message to others or physically copied the e-mail and gave it to others.
Although the evidence was not exactly clear as to who received the e-
mails, the Waco Court of Appeals reversed a jury verdict in favor of the
employee, holding that there was no evidence that Mars "published" the
e-mail messages because the only people who received the messages were
people who were within the scope of the qualified privilege to receive the
e-mail. 200
The employer in Gonzalez dodged a bullet. Electronic mail is such a
prevalent form of communication these days that employers cannot rely
on the defense of non-publication to avoid liability for defamation in a
world of instantaneous electronic communications. The dissent in Gon-
zalez recognized this fact, and suggested that the only way Mars could
have avoided liability was to have immediately shut down its e-mail
server and remove the defamatory e-mail.20' Is shutting down a com-
pany's e-mail server a practical response? With the millions of e-mail
messages that criss-cross the Internet on a daily basis, it seems impractical
to suggest that an employer shut down its e-mail server every time a po-
tentially defamatory e-mail is discovered.
In Gonzales v. Levi Strauss & Co.,202 the San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals applied well-established law in upholding summary judgment for
198. Goodman, 80 S.W.3d at 579.
199. Mars, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 71 S.W.3d 434 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, pet. denied).
200. Id. at 441.
201. Id. at 442.
202. Gonzales v. Levi Strauss & Co., 70 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. App-San Antonio 2002, no
pet. h.).
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the employer on a defamation claim by two former employees terminated
for using poor judgment and violating company rules. The two employ-
ees alleged that the company defamed them in connection with their ter-
mination. The court held that the allegedly defamatory statements were
qualifiedly privileged because they were uttered only to those who were
involved in the investigation of the incident or the employees' unemploy-
ment claims.20 3 Moreover, there was no evidence that the manager knew
his statements were false or that he made them with reckless disregard
about their truth, thus the defendant successfully negated the element of
actual malice. 20 4 Finally, while recognizing the doctrine of compelled
self-publication,20 5 the court held that the evidence affirmatively negated
the first element, that is the plaintiffs could not show that they were not
aware of the company's reasons for terminating their employment. 206
D. FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION AND TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
In Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. v. Cottey,207 a terminated hospital
executive sued a group of three hospitals that allegedly induced him into
coming to work for the hospital group on the promise that he would par-
ticipate in a "top hat" investment plan that would fully vest in six years.
However, managers of the hospital group failed to inform him at the time
of his hire that the investment plan could be rescinded at any time at the
discretion of the company. The jury awarded the plaintiff damages on his
claim of fraudulent inducement.20 8
On appeal, the defendants argued that the plaintiff ratified or waived
any fraudulent inducement by continuing to work for the hospital once he
was informed that the investment plan could be rescinded. The Waco
Court of Appeals observed that ratification and waiver is a question of
intent, and that there was no evidence that the plaintiff ever intended to
ratify or waive his claim of fraudulent inducement simply by continuing
to work for the hospital.209
The defendants also sought reversal on grounds that the evidence of
the fraudulent inducement claim was legally and factually insufficient.
The defendants argued that the "intent" element of a fraudulent induce-
ment claim required that the plaintiff prove that the defendants had no
203. Id. at 282.
204. Id. at 282-83.
205. Compelled self-publication occurs if the defamed person's communication to a
third party was made without awareness of the defamatory nature of the statement and if
the circumstances indicate that the statement to the third party was likely. See Chasewood
Constr. Co. v. Rico, 696 S.W.2d 439, 445 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e).
Not all courts in Texas have accepted the validity of the doctrine. See Doe v. SmithCline
Beecham Corp., 855 S.W.2d 248, 259 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993), affd as modified, 903
S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1995).
206. Gonzalez, 70 S.W.3d at 284.
207. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. v. Cottey, 72 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. App.-Waco
2002, no pet. h.).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 742.
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intent to carry out the investment plan at the time the plaintiff was hired.
The court rejected this argument, holding that all that is needed to prove
the intent element was evidence that the defendant intended the plaintiff
to act or rely upon the false statement.210
In Evans v. Reliant Energy, Inc.,211 the employer had a conflict of inter-
est policy that did not strictly prohibit employees from moonlighting.
However, the employer's policy prohibited employees from engaging in
activities that might conflict or give the appearance of a conflict with their
responsibilities to the employer. The plaintiffs not only worked for Reli-
ant Energy, but they also worked part time for a company that purchased
used equipment from Reliant Energy. When the employer discovered
this, it instructed the employees to stop working for the other company or
face termination from Reliant Energy. The plaintiffs eventually left or
were fired from their employment. They sued their former employer for
tortious interference alleging that the employer interfered with their em-
ployment agreements with another company. In upholding summary
judgment for the employer, the Houston Court of Appeals, First District,
observed that the employer had a bona fide right to enforce its conflicts
of interest policy, and therefore, was legally justified to require that its
employees follow its policy. Their terminations were excused as a matter
of law.2 12
E. NEGLIGENCE-BASED CLAIMS
Negligence-based claims are favored by the plaintiffs' bar because, un-
like many statutory-based claims, negligence claims require no exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies. Further, the doctrine of employment at
will essentially forecloses claims for wrongful termination or breach of
contract, and frequently the only viable claim against the employer will
be based on a negligence theory. During the Survey period, the Texas
Supreme Court issued a number of important decisions that might make
negligence-based claim more difficult to assert in the future.
Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sears213 is a good example
of this phenomenon. In this case, an insurance agent asserted a claim for
negligent investigation after the insurance company terminated his
agency contract following an investigation of an alleged kick back
scheme. The agent alleged that the company was negligent in conducting
the investigation and that he would have not been terminated but for the
negligent investigation. On intermediate appeal, the court of appeals
ruled that the company owed the agent a duty of care, but otherwise re-
versed and remanded on grounds that the evidence was factually insuffi-
210. Id. at 745.
211. Evans v. Reliant Energy, Inc., No. 01-01-00855-CV, 2002 WL 31838088 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet. h.).
212. Id. at *3.
213. Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sears, 84 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. 2002).
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cient to support the jury's verdict on the negligent investigation claim.214
On a petition for review, the Texas Supreme Court was asked to decide
whether a company owes an at-will employee a duty of care in investigat-
ing alleged misconduct. In doing so, the supreme court resolved a split in
the courts of appeals as to whether employers owe a duty of care to its
employees once it undertakes an investigation of employee miscon-
duct.215 One lower court had taken the position that a company owed no
duty of care because an employer could terminate an at-will employee for
no reason without ever conducting an investigation in the first in-
stance.216 However, another lower court took the position that once, the
employer undertook the investigation, it owed the employee a duty of
care in conducting the investigation. 21 7
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals and declined to recog-
nize the tort of negligent investigation in the employment context. In
doing so, the supreme court held that adoption of the tort of negligent
investigation in the context of an employment setting would eviscerate
the long standing doctrine of employment at will. Allowing employees to
assert a claim for negligent investigation would discourage employers
from investigating employee misconduct. Under the doctrine of employ-
ment at will, employers would rather terminate an employee with no risk
of a wrongful termination suit rather than investigate employee miscon-
duct and subject itself to the risk of a negligent misrepresentation
claim.218
In light of Texas Farm Bureau, it is still an open question whether other
negligence-based claims will be recognized by the supreme court. Will
the supreme court recognize a claim for negligent drug testing?2 19 Will
courts continue to recognize claims for negligent hiring, training, or su-
pervision? Perhaps the supreme court should draw a line that recognizes
a negligence-based claim when the claim is asserted by a third party who
is injured by the negligence of the employer, or when the employee is
injured by the negligence of the employer and the employer is a nonsub-
scriber under the workers' compensation laws. Texas Farm Bureau might
serve as a signal to the lower courts to reject negligence-based claims
when it appears that the employee is seeking to assert a cause of action
that would abrogate the doctrine of employment at will.
Despite the court's opinion in Texas Farm Bureau, not all negligence-
based claims by an employee against the employer are foreclosed. For
example, in D. Houston, Inc. v. Love,220 the Texas Supreme Court af-
214. Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sears, 54 S.W.3d 361, 367 (Tex. App-Waco
2001, pet. granted).
215. Tex. Farm Bureau, 84 S.W. 3d at 607-08.
216. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lane, 31 S.W.3d 282, 294 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2000, pet. denied).
217. See Tex. Farm Bureau, 54 S.W.3d at 367.
218. Tex. Farm Bureau, 84 S.W.3d at 610.
219. See Mission Petroleum Carriers, Inc. v. Solomon, 37 S.W.3d 482 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 2001, pet. granted).
220. D. Houston, Inc. v. Love, 92 S.W.3d 450 (Tex. 2002).
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firmed the judgment of the lower court, holding that the Texas Dram
Shop Act does not preempt an employer's duty to employees who be-
come intoxicated at work, and that employers still have the duty to see
that there is no unreasonable risk of harm to employees.221 Similarly, in
Excel Corp. v. Apodaca,222 the supreme court reiterated that a nonsub-
scriber owes a duty of care to employees who are injured in the course
and scope of their employment even though, in that particular case, the
employee failed to produce evidence that his cumulative trauma injuries
were the cause in fact for his injuries.2 23 In Wrenn v. G.A. T.X. Logistics,
Inc.,224 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment in
favor of the employer on the plaintiff's negligent hiring and supervision
claims, holding that the employer's knowledge of the supervisor's pro-
pensity for violence raised a fact issue on the element of foreseeability. 25
Frequently an employee of a subcontractor will sue the general con-
tractor for injuries sustained by the employee on the premises of the gen-
eral contractor. Such was the case in Dow Chemical Co. v. Bright.226 In
this case, an employee of the subcontractor sued the general contractor
after he was injured from a falling pipe that had been installed by another
employee of the subcontractor. The plaintiff argued that the general con-
tractor retained sufficient actual control over the subcontractor's work
such that the general contractor remained liable for the employee's inju-
ries. The plaintiff asserted the following evidence in support of his actual
control argument: (1) the general contractor could have stopped the work
had it known of the hazardous condition; (2) the general contractor's
safety representative, who was present on site, should have refused to
issue a safe work permit; (3) the general contractor failed to implement
minimum safety rules and required subcontractor's employees to attend
safety meetings; and (4) the general contractor issued safety manuals and
safety rules that the subcontractor's employees were required to fol-
low. 227 The Texas Supreme Court rejected all of these points, holding
that none of them established that the general contractor retained suffi-
cient actual control over the work of the subcontractor to make the gen-
eral contractor liable for the injuries of the subcontractor's employees.228
At best, this was evidence that the general contractor retained a general
right to recommend a safe manner for the subcontractor's employees to
perform their work; however, it does not subject the general contractor to
liability for injuries to the subcontractor's employees.22 9
221. Id. at 454.
222. Excel Corp. v. Apodaca, 81 S.W.3d 817 (Tex. 2002).
223. Id. at 820.
224. Wrenn v. G.A.T.X. Logistics, Inc., 73 S.W.3d 489 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002,
pet. filed).
225. Id. at 500.
226. Dow Chem. Co. v. Bright, 89 S.W.3d 602 (Tex. 2002).
227. Id. at 607-08.
228. Id. at 609-10.
229. Id. at 607 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 cmt. c (1965)).
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Whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor is an
issue that is frequently litigated. This issue is often crucial because the
outcome of a case will turn on whether a party is an independent contrac-
tor or an employee. Such was the case in Limestone Products Distribu-
tion, Inc. v. McNamara.230 In this case, a former employee turned
independent contractor fatally injured a motorcycle driver when he col-
lided with the motorcycle driver on his way to work. The independent
contractor was not driving his truck, but was driving his personal automo-
bile. The plaintiffs sued the employer, a limestone distributor, alleging
that the driver was an employee of the company and that he was acting in
the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. The
employer argued that while the individual was a former employee, he
became an independent contractor when he bought his own truck,
worked his own hours, was not entitled to any employee benefits, and no
taxes or withholdings were deducted from his paycheck. The plaintiff ar-
gued, on the other hand, that the driver continued to perform the same
work that he performed when he was an employee and that the driver
was still listed as an employee on the company's records. The supreme
court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and held that the
driver was an independent contractor.231 In so holding, the supreme
court observed that the company did nothing but tell the driver when to
pick up loads and where to deliver them. Other than that, the driver was
free to drive any route he wished, so long as the materials were delivered
on time. Other indications of the driver's independent contractor status
were the fact that the driver supplied his own truck, paid for his own fuel
and maintenance, and paid his own social security and income taxes. Fur-
thermore, the company supplied no tools or equipment and reported his
income on a 1099.232
The courts of appeals also decided a number of negligence-based
claims in the Survey period. In Supreme Beef Packers, Inc. v. Maddox,233
the Texarkana Court of Appeals was asked to decide whether a violation
of the regulations of the Occupational Health and Safety Administration
("OSHA") could serve as a basis for a claim of negligence per se. The
court held that the OSHA rules in question did nothing to impose a
mandatory standard of conduct. Instead, the OSHA rules at issue merely
established a standard of care in which the company was supposed to
comply with whenever possible.2 34 Accordingly, the trial court erred
when it charged the jury on a negligence per se standard. In Allen v.
A&T Transportation Co.,2 35 an employee sued his employer when a
230. Limestone Prods. Distrib., Inc. v. McNamara, 71 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. 2002) (per
curiam).
231. Id. at 312-13.
232. Id.
233. Supreme Beef Packers, Inc. v. Maddox, 67 S.W.3d 453 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2002, pet. denied).
234. Id. at 457-58.




tanker truck driven by the employee overturned while exiting a highway.
There was evidence that the employee had prior experience driving liq-
uid-carrying tanker trucks. The employee argued that the employer had
a non-delegable duty to properly train him on the hazards of driving a
tanker truck partially filled with liquid. The Texarkana Court of Appeals
rejected this argument, ruling that an employer has no duty to give spe-
cial training to an experienced tanker driver unless there was an unusual
or hazardous condition known to the employer but unknown to the
employee.2 36
Concerned with rising workers' compensation costs, some employers in
the past have opted out of the Texas workers' compensation system alto-
gether and adopted their own form of employee injury benefit plan that
replaces traditional workers' compensation benefits with contractual ben-
efits supplied by the employer.2 37 Many of these plans required that the
employee waive his or her common law rights as a condition for accepting
benefits. Although such plans are now illegal under Texas law, 238 such a
plan was at issue in Reyes v. Storage & Processors, Inc.239 In Reyes, the
plaintiff, apparently unable to speak or read English, nevertheless exe-
cuted a waiver of common law claims pursuant to the employer's Acci-
dent Employee Welfare Benefit Plan. The plan itself was written in
English, although, there was evidence that a Spanish speaker explained
the plan to the employee in Spanish. In addition, the employee executed
a document in Spanish that purported to show that the employee read
and understood the plan. Despite evidence that the employee waived his
common law claims, the Texarkana Court of Appeals reversed summary
judgment in favor of the employer on grounds that the waiver did not
meet the criteria of the express negligence doctrine because the waiver
did not meet the requirement of conspicuousness.2 40 Furthermore, the
employee did not ratify the agreement by accepting benefits because his
acceptance of benefits was not with full knowledge of all the relevant
facts. 241 Cases with facts such as Reyes are likely to be a thing of the past.
Because prospective waivers are now illegal in Texas, employer plans
containing prospective waivers, regardless of whether they meet the stan-
dards of the express negligence doctrine, will not be enforceable.
F. SABINE PILOT CLAIMS
In Texas, the only common law exception to the employment at will
doctrine is for claims that arise under Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v.
236. Id. at 71.
237. See, e.g., Lawrence v. CDB Servs., Inc., 44 S.W.3d 544 (Tex. 2001).
238. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.33(e) (Vernon 2001) (adopted in response to the
Supreme Court's opinion in Lawrence).
239. Reyes v. Storage & Processors, Inc., 86 S.W.3d 344 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002,
pet. denied).
240. Id. at 350.
241. Id. at 351.
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Hauck.242 Commonly referred to as a Sabine Pilot claim, an employee,
despite his or her at-will status, may assert a wrongful termination claim
as long as he or she alleges that he or she was required by the employer
to perform an illegal act, and that the employee was terminated solely
because he or she refused to perform the illegal act.243 The key to a Sab-
ine Pilot claim is that the act required by the employer must be illegal. In
Klumpe v. IBP, Inc.,244 an employee of IBP, the stepfather of another
employee who had been injured on the job, was asked to secure a release
from his stepson. The employee refused to secure the release and main-
tained that the release was deceptive because its description did not ade-
quately describe the benefits that the stepson would receive in exchange
for the waiver. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the em-
ployer's excuse for terminating the employee was a pretext, but nonethe-
less upheld judgment as a matter of law in favor of the employer on
grounds that the act of securing a release was not illegal because the
description was not deceptive.2 45
In the context of public employment, the San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals confronted the issue of whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity
bars a Sabine Pilot claim lodged against a county government employer.
In Salazar v. Lopez,246 a deputy sheriff was allegedly terminated after he
refused to commit perjury when he testified as a witness in an automobile
accident trial in which another deputy sheriff was the defendant. The
court upheld dismissal of the case in favor of the county, holding that the
Texas legislature has not waived sovereign immunity with respect to Sab-
ine Pilot claims.247
Does successfully litigating a Sabine Pilot claim mean than the plaintiff
should recover attorneys' fees? This issue was addressed much to the
chagrin of the plaintiffs' bar in Garcia v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc.248 In this
case, the plaintiff sought attorney's fees pursuant to Chapter 38 of the
Civil Practices and Remedies Code, which provides for an award of attor-
neys' fees for breach of an oral or written contract. The plaintiff argued
that a Sabine Pilot claim was akin to a breach of contract, and therefore,
an award of attorneys' fees was appropriate. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected this argument, holding that a Sabine Pilot claim
sounded in tort, not in contract. 249 Further, the court noted that the
Texas Supreme Court specifically rejected a claim for attorneys' fees for
wrongful termination under Chapter 451 of the Texas Labor Code, and a
Sabine Pilot claim is more akin to a retaliatory discharge claim than a
breach of contract claim.250
242. Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
243. Id. at 735.
244. Klumpe v. IBP, Inc., 309 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002).
245. Id. at 286-87.
246. Salazar v. Lopez, 88 S.W.3d 351 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet. h.).
247. Id. at 353.
248. Garcia v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 310 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2002).
249. Id. at 404-05.




In Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C.,251 the Texas Supreme Court
was asked to solve a unique non-competition issue in the context of a law
firm setting. In Johnson, a law firm sued a former associate for breach of
fiduciary duty, among other causes of action, after the associate allegedly
referred a lucrative personal injury case to another lawyer who was not a
member of the law firm. Although the supreme court upheld the decision
of the intermediate appellate court, which had overturned the summary
judgment of the trial court, in doing so it placed limits on how far an
employer or a law firm may go in construing that a fiduciary relationship
exists between an employer and its employee. The supreme court specifi-
cally held that a law firm associate might refer a matter to another law
firm without breaching any fiduciary duty as long as the associate receives
no benefit, compensation, or gain as a result.252 Thus, while the supreme
court remanded because there was a fact issue that precluded summary
judgment, the court left the door open for a law firm's lawyers to freely
refer matters to other law firms besides their own, as long as the referring
lawyer does not gain anything.
There were several decisions in the Survey period that interpreted the
now seminal noncompete decision in Texas, Light v Centel Cellular Co. of
Texas.253 In American Fracmaster, Ltd. v. Richardson,25 4 the Tyler Court
of Appeals observed that an employer's promise to give an employee no
less than twelve months notice if the termination is for no cause does not
give rise to the company's interest in restraining the employee from com-
peting, and therefore, the non-compete agreement was unenforceable. 255
Similarly, a noncompete provision contained in a severance agreement is
not enforceable if the consideration is payment of the severance pay.2 56
In Anderson Chemical Co. v. Green,257 the Amarillo Court of Appeals
held that a non-competition clause was unenforceable for the same rea-
sons. The only enforceable promise made by the employer was its prom-
ise to give the employee ten days notice of termination if he was to be
terminated for cause. The court held that this promise, even if enforcea-
ble, did not give rise to the employer's interest in restraining
251. Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193 (Tex. 2002).
252. Id. at 203.
253. Light v Centel Cellular Co. of Tex., 883 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1994). To have an en-
forceable non-compete agreement in Texas, the agreement must be ancillary to an other-
wise enforceable contract. A two-part test applies to whether the agreement is otherwise
enforceable. First, the consideration given by the employer must give rise to the employers
in restraining the employee from competing. Second, the covenant must be designed to
enforce the employee's consideration or return promise in the otherwise enforceable
agreement. Id. at 647.
254. Am. Fracmaster, Ltd. v. Richardson, 71 S.W.3d 381 (Tex. App-Tyler 2001, pet.
denied).
255. Id. at 387.
256. Id. at 389.
257. Anderson Chem. Co. v. Green, 66 S.W.3d 434 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.
h.).
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competition.258
American National Insurance Co. v. Cannon2 59 presented a unique
non-competition issue in the context of a class action certification. In this
case, a group of insurance agents sought class certification in a declara-
tory judgment case, a case in which the covenant not to compete con-
tained various geographical limitations depending on the size of the
agent's sales territory. The Beaumont Court of Appeals reversed class
certification on grounds that construing the geographic reasonableness of
the non-competition agreement for each insurance agent would be un-
manageable and presented individual issues inconsistent with class
certification.260
V. ARBITRATION
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc. 261 is one of the more important arbitration
cases decided in the Survey period. The primary issue in Waffle House
centered on whether the EEOC could pursue in its lawsuit victim-specific
relief for an aggrieved individual who had entered into a private arbitra-
tion agreement with his employer. The employer argued that in seeking
back pay and other damages for the individual, the EEOC stepped into
the shoes of the employee, who could not by virtue of the arbitration
agreement seek these types of damages if he had brought his own lawsuit.
The EEOC argued that it was not a party to the arbitration agreement,
and its powers to enforce the nation's anti-discrimination laws would be
greatly diminished if its hands were constrained by a private arbitration
agreement between an employer and an employee. In addition, the
EEOC argued that its ability to recover victim-specific relief enhanced its
role as the federal government's top anti-discrimination law enforcement
agency. In a 6-3 decision, the United States Supreme Court held that
neither the Federal Arbitration Act, nor the Americans with Disabilities
Act, constrained the EEOC from seeking victim-specific relief. When the
EEOC files suit, it seeks to vindicate the public interest. Title VII and
the ADA would be undermined if private agreements were given more
effect than the enforcement scheme entailed in the statutes.262
In re Halliburton Co. 263 is an important case because it cleared up
some confusion among the courts of appeals as to whether an arbitration
agreement could exist in the context of at-will employment. In Hallibur-
ton, the intermediate appellate court took the position that an arbitration
agreement was not valid in the context of at-will employment because the
company was free to terminate the employee at any time, and thus, the
company's consideration for the arbitration agreement, continued em-
258. Id. at 439.
259. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Cannon, 86 S.W.3d 801 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002, no pet.
h.).
260. Id. at 808.
261. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
262. Id. at 295-96.
263. In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. 2002).
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ployment, was illusory. The lower court relied on the seminal noncom-
pete case of Light v. Centel Cellular of Texas as support for this position.
In Halliburton, the Texas Supreme Court clarified that the promise of
continued employment was not the consideration that served to validate
the arbitration agreement. Rather, it was a bilateral promise to arbitrate
that served as the mutual consideration. Accordingly, the supreme court
granted the writ of mandamus and ordered mediation.264
Ironically, about a month before the ruling in Halliburton, the Houston
Court of Appeals for the First District, in In re Kellogg Brown & Root,265
interpreting the same Halliburton arbitration agreement, ordered arbitra-
tion for the same reasons, namely, that the bilateral nature of the arbitra-
tion agreement served as mutual consideration to bind both parties to
their promise of arbitration.266 Doomed by this argument, the plaintiff
argued that arbitration should be denied because it would be a violation
of public policy to require arbitration over a dispute for workers' com-
pensation benefits. The court, however, noted correctly that a claim for
workers' compensation retaliation is not a claim for workers' compensa-
tion benefits, and thus the claim of the plaintiff fell within the ambit of
the arbitration agreement.267
Mohamed v. Auto Nation USA Corp.268 confronts the issue of whether
a corporate successor in interest may enforce an arbitration agreement
between an employee and the predecessor company. In this case, the
employee entered into an arbitration agreement with Park Place-South,
an automobile dealership. Subsequent to the plaintiff's hire, Park Place-
South sold its interest in the dealership to Auto Nation. Thereafter, the
plaintiff sued Auto Nation for a number of employment-related torts
stemming from his employment at Auto Nation. Auto Nation moved to
compel arbitration, arguing that it was a successor in interest to Park
Place-South. The Houston Court of Appeals, First District, granted the
writ of mandamus and ordered the lower court to vacate its order of arbi-
tration, holding that the defendant never satisfied its burden of showing
that the arbitration agreement was assigned to the benefit of the Auto
Nation.269 Moreover, the defendant was unable to show that there were
any equitable grounds for upholding the order of arbitration.
This same issue arose in the case of In re Eagle Global Logistics,
L.P.,270 only this time with the roles reversed. In EGL, the company
sued an ex-salesman and his new company, alleging that the salesman
revealed its confidential information to his new employer in violation of a
264. Id. at 569.
265. In re Kellogg Brown & Root, 80 S.W.3d 611 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002,
pet. denied).
266. Id. at 616.
267. Id. at 617.
268. Mohamed v. Auto Nation USA Corp., 89 S.W.3d 830 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2002, no pet. h.).
269. Id. at 838.
270. In re Eagle Global Logistics, L.P., 89 S.W.3d 761 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2002, pet. denied).
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confidentiality agreement. The confidentiality agreement contained an
arbitration agreement that required the parties to arbitrate any employ-
ment-related claims between the two parties. When the new employer
sought to compel arbitration, along with the ex-employee, EGL argued
that the new company could not compel arbitration because it was not a
signatory to the arbitration agreement. The Houston Court of Appeals,
First District, denied mandamus relief to EGL on grounds that the new
employer was entitled to arbitration as well because the claims of the
company against the ex-employee and the new employer were so inter-
twined, that equity required that the claims be decided in one forum, and
that forum would be arbitration because EGL agreed that forum would
decide the dispute. 271
Whether to have a stand alone arbitration agreement or to have it inte-
grated into the employee handbook is sometimes an issue for counsel
drafting arbitration agreements. The employee handbook approach was
endorsed in In re Tenet Healthcare, Ltd.272 In this case, the employee
signed an arbitration agreement that was contained in the employee
handbook. The employee handbook, however, contained the usual at-
will provisions and other disclaimers that renounced the handbook as a
binding contract. In urging the court of appeals to reject arbitration, the
plaintiff argued that the disclaimer language made the arbitration agree-
ment unenforceable. The Houston Court of Appeals, First District, re-
jected this argument, holding that the arbitration clause in the handbook
contained mutual promises of both parties to forego their procedural
rights in favor of arbitration, and that the arbitration clause was a binding
contract despite the disclaimer language. 273
VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing cases illustrate that labor and employment issues are di-
verse and require the Texas practitioner to remain constantly vigilant of
the trends and changes that make up the practice of labor and employ-
ment law. Congress, and the state legislature, are likely to pass laws that
protect and preserve employee rights. The doctrine of employment at
will will no doubt be tested in the future by legal theories that place new
duties upon employers to their employees. Settled doctrines may become
unsettled in challenging economic times. Whatever the situation, cases is
this Survey period will influence courts in future cases.
271. Id. at 766.
272. In re Tenet Healthcare, Ltd., 84 S.W.3d 760 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002,
no pet.).
273. Id. at 766-67.
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